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We explore a new technique for safe patch fingerprinting to au-
tomate vulnerability scanning of network servers. Our technique
helps automate the discovery of inputs that safely discriminate
vulnerable from patched servers for the latest vulnerabilities. This
enables rapid updates to vulnerability scanning tools as new soft-
ware vulnerabilities are discovered, allowing administrators to scan
and secure their networks more quickly. To ensure such scans are
safe and ethical, we need to reject inputs with malicious side effects.
We have implemented a framework, based on delta execution,
which tests the discriminative property of such inputs, as well as
their safety. We use a fuzzer to find promising candidate inputs
to further automate the process. To illustrate the potential of this
approach, we present a Heartbleed case study.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Vulnerability scanners allow administrators and researchers to
prove that a host is vulnerable to certain attacks. Most of such
scanners focus on web-applications, since many web-exploits (e.g,
SQL injection and cross-site-scripting) can be detected using a small
set of inputs. These vulnerabilities arise due to lack of input saniti-
zation and the scanner relies on well-known web technologies to
ensure the vulnerability reveals itself.
Compiled server applications, on the other hand, are more dif-
ficult to scan, as these are not built using a common, interpreted
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technology stack. Scanners must be equipped with vulnerability-
specific scripts, which take more time to develop and test. For ex-
ample, ZMap [3] offers a script specifically to scan for Heartbleed,
which is not trivial to develop.
In this paper, we investigate a novel method we call safe patch
fingerprinting, which aims to fingerprint behavioral changes of a
server as a result of applying a security patch. More specifically,
we want to discover specific inputs which provoke a response that
allows us to remotely discriminate between patched and unpatched
versions. We shall call such inputs discriminators.
Automating the fingerprinting process will allow vulnerability
scanners to be updated quickly, allowing organizations to assess
vulnerability impact and take necessary precautions. Alternatively,
automated fingerprinting can be used when developing a security
patch to ensure it is seamless and thus cannot be fingerprinted.
Because this method is patch-based, its detection capabilities
generalize across many versions of the vulnerable server. This
is important, because when patches are backported, many major
versions end up having both vulnerable and patched builds, making
version information an unreliable indicator of vulnerabilities.
We must ensure that such scans do not harm production servers,
especially when using the technique on a large scale. This is chal-
lenging, given that many different versions of a server can respond
differently to particular stimuli. Hence, automation is essential as
it allows extensive testing before use in production.
In this research, our main focus is on discriminator testing, which
involves testing whether a given input to a server allows us to dis-
criminate vulnerable from patched builds in a safe manner. Besides
this, we have taken an initial step towards automated discriminator
discovery using a fuzzer.
This work represents a first step. Once the technique hasmatured,
it could be used for vulnerability scanning, even at the Internet scale.
ZMap [3] offers an infrastructure to quickly scan a large number
of hosts, which—combined with our technique—could allow us to
measure patch adoption over time.
In Section 2 we given an overview of the system and related
terminology. In Section 3 we discuss the design of the discriminator
testing and discriminator discovery systems. The implementation of
the former is discussed in Section 4, followed by the evaluation in
section 5. Some related work can be found in Section 6. Finally, we
discuss some findings and conclude in Sections 7 and 8 respectively.
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Figure 1: Overview of the patch fingerprinting framework.
2 OVERVIEW
This paper we primarily focus on discriminator testing, a method
to decide whether an input safely discriminates the patch and un-
patched version. Finding such discriminators requires complex
constraints to be satisfied, as discussed later. We also extend our
system for automated discovery of discriminators using the test
method we have devised. The whole system is shown in Figure 1.
Given a vulnerability and its patch, we compile both the original
and the patched version of the server. A fuzzer is then used on each
of the compiled binaries, to generate a set of inputs that may be
discriminators. We bootstrap the fuzzing process using a number
of seed inputs. These could either be known or could be generated
using an exploit script. Once candidate inputs are generated, we can
test whether any of them is a discriminator. We do this by passing
them into an instrumented server, which uses a technique called
delta execution [10] to analyze how both versions of the server
behave. The inputs that are valid discriminators are returned at the
end.
Patches usually affect groups of source code lines, which are
called hunks. These lines correspond to groups of compiled instruc-
tions which we refer to as patch-sites.
Discriminators are inputs having the following properties:
• Program execution must reach a patch-site. In other words,
the input must cause added or modified instructions to be
executed.
• The input must infect the program state. This means that
there must be memory state divergence between the execu-
tion of the original and patched build of a server. Memory
bytes that differ between these executions are said to be in-
fected. This infection can spread as data is copied, combined
or used in branching conditions. Infections can be removed
when the bytes converge to the same value.
• The infected program state must propagate to the output,
such that the difference between the patched and unpatched
server externally visible and thus observable by the vulnera-
bility scanner. Inputs that have this property are said to be
propagating.
• It must be safe, meaning that input does not exploit the
vulnerability in a harmful way. What this means depends on
both the vulnerability and the server. Therefore, the safety
requirements must be established by an analyst.
To summarize, we need to test whether an input exercises the vul-
nerable code, resulting in a state divergence causing an observable
effect, discriminating the two versions, without actually exploiting
the vulnerability.
2.1 Safety
For a discriminator to be usable in real-world scenarios, it must
be safe to use. As stated before, what safety is depends on the
context. We define two broad types of safety to be used for two
types of vulnerabilities: Integrity means that the program state
was not corrupted. In other words, no modified state must cause
the program to malfunction or behave on behalf of the attacker.
Confidentiality means that no internal information is leaked to
the attacker. This distinction is important as both require different
methods of ensuring safety.
Besides the type of vulnerability, safety also depends on char-
acteristics of the server. For example, crashing a process is nor-
mally considered unsafe. However, some servers, such as Nginx
and Apache, will automatically fork off new worker processes once
this happens, undoing the damage that was done. One can argue
that process crashes are safe in this scenario. Alternatively, a buffer-
overflow vulnerability might only be detectable remotely if we
attempt an overflow, forcing us to overflow at least a single byte.
Depending on the memory layout, this could be harmless or very
damaging. Because modern compilers add padding to data struc-
tures, small overflows may be perfectly safe.
2.2 Propagation
Wewant to leak one bit of information: whether the patch is applied
to the server or not. Besides regular I/O, other channels may exist
through which we can leak this bit, such as timing side-channels.
These are outside the scope of this work.
As opposed to reachability and infection, it is not known whether
propagating inputs exist for a vulnerability. When the vulnerable
code has no information flows that lead back to the network, no
discriminator exists and we will not be able to scan for it. In our
work, we focus on determining whether a given input propagates,
rather than efficiently finding propagating inputs, for arbitrary
vulnerabilities.
In this work, we only consider propagation of infected state
towards the write-family of system calls. Other I/O functions can
easily be supported. Propagation can happen because both the
original and patched version send a different data buffer, which
we call propagation-through-difference or because only one version
sends a response at all (propagation-through-absence). In the latter
case, we should repeat the request a few times to ascertain ourselves
that the lack of a response is not caused by host or network failure.
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Original echo server
1 typedef struct {int size; char buf [99];} echo_t;
2
3 void handle_request(int clientfd) {
4 echo_t *e = malloc(sizeof(echo_t ));
5 read(clientfd , &e->size , sizeof(int));
6 read(clientfd , e->buf , e->size);






typedef struct {int size; char buf [99];} echo_t;
void handle_request(int clientfd) {
echo_t *e = malloc(sizeof(echo_t ));
read(clientfd , &e->size , sizeof(int ));
if (e->size > 0 && e->size <= 99) {
read(clientfd , echo ->buf , e->size);




Figure 2: Echo server contains a buffer overflow vulnerability. It can be safely detected using a small overflow that only over-
writes padding bytes
2.3 Example
In Figure 2, we demonstrate an echo server, which has a simple
buffer overflow vulnerability. By providing a size that is larger than
99, we can overflow the buffer on the heap.
To discriminate, we are forced to overflow the buffer and see
how the server responds. Fortunately, compilers align structures in
memory to at least 4-byte boundaries. Thus, echo_t has a size of 104
bytes. Therefore, it is safe to send 100 bytes, without corrupting the
server. This is a good example of propagation-through-absence as
the patched server will not respond when a 100 bytes are sent to it.
3 DESIGN
3.1 Discriminator testing
Finding out whether a given input is a discriminator could be done
by running both the patched and the unpatched builds and see
if a particular input leads to different observable outcomes. How-
ever, each execution of the server may be different due to non-
determinism, timing and other factors, which complicates discovery
testing. Furthermore, it is impossible to rule out memory corrup-
tion, as this may only become evident under specific circumstances.
We could compare the state of both executions to inspect diverged
state. As we assume the patched version is not vulnerable, having
identical program state implies that the unpatched version is not
corrupted.
Unfortunately, comparing the state is difficult as there are many
reasons for divergence, besides execution of a patch-site. Timing,
randomization, thread-interleaving, interactions with the OS, and
subtle differences in binary layout caused by the patch can all result
in spurious state differences. To properly isolate the effects of the
patch, all this noise and non-determinism must be eradicated.
We have implemented delta execution [10], which allows us to
only run a patch-site of the program (delta code) in parallel. The
common code is running as a single execution (merged execution).
When we reach delta code, we split off into two different executions.
We are now running a split execution. These executionswill continue
to run, and state differences introduced by delta code can be easily
extracted. At specific moments, we attempt to merge, which means
that we compare the state of the two executions. When there are
no differences, we drop one of the executions and let the other
continue as a merged execution.
Delta execution has a number of advantages. First of all, it runs
a single execution most of the time, eradicating most diverged state
that would otherwise appear between separate runs of the server.
The diverged state we observe will thus be a result of the patch.
This will only work when a small part of the program was modified
by the patch. Fortunately, security patches tend to be small [10] so
we can stay in merged execution most of the time. Secondly, when
merging is successful, all infected state is gone, giving strong safety
guarantees. Finally, delta execution helps us find propagating inputs,
because we can easily interpose I/O calls during split execution and
observe any differences.
Besides integrity, we must also address the problem of confiden-
tiality in case of information disclosure vulnerabilities. This is an
extremely difficult problem to fully solve, as it would require data
flow analysis and annotating data structures as sensitive. Therefore,
we assume that information disclosure vulnerabilities are exploited
using controlled memory copy (such as memcpy()), which will vi-
olate data structure boundaries and may read uninitialized data.
This allows us to use the AddressSanitizer (ASan) [8] which detects
out-of-bounds access to stack, heap and globals, and the Memo-
rySanitizer (MSan) [9] to catch uninitialized reads (UMR). Our delta
execution framework can run with either one of these sanitizers. It
is recommended to run both when working with an information
disclosure vulnerability.
3.2 Discriminator discovery
To make discriminator discovery feasible, we assume that one or
more seed inputs are known that exercise the patched code. In other
words, they must have the reachability and infection. These could be
generated by an available exploit script but could also be crashing
inputs found by fuzzing. They will not be safe as they result in a
crash or even full exploitation. Also it is unknown whether they
will propagate.
We use VUzzer [7], which is a mutation-based evolutionary
fuzzer to mutate these seed inputs. The intuition is that discrimina-
tors look a lot like these malicious inputs, except that they will not
result in a crash or exploitation.
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VUzzer was designed to work with locally executed programs
that accept input via STDIN. A single read() would consume input,
which VUzzer would taint and track during execution. Bytes, at
specific offsets, that are used by CMP instructions are targeted by
the fuzzer to maximize basic-block coverage, which is trivial when
the other CMP operand is a constant.
We have made a few modifications to the fuzzer to make it
work for servers. Instead of sending input to STDIN, an application-
specific setup script will start the server, establish a connection and
carry out initial interactions such as authentication. Finally, the
fuzzer-generated payload will be sent to the server and VUzzer will
start taint-tracking on the first read() call that is executed. We also
made VUzzer maximize basic-block coverage inside the patched
function rather than the entire application.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation uses the LLVM infrastructure [5] to automat-
ically transform existing C/C++ applications. In this section, we
will discuss the two most important components in our delta execu-
tion framework, which are the deltafy compiler pass, which merges
two almost identical LLVM bitcode files, and the libdelta shared li-
brary, which coordinates delta execution during run-time at process
granularity.
4.1 Deltafy pass
The deltafy pass takes two LLVM bitcode files, which represent our
original and patched version. First it compares all functions to find
the one(s) modified by the patch. It then moves the patched versions
of all modified functions into the original bitcode file and introduces
a proxy function for each affected function. This proxy function acts
as a switch between the different versions of the function, passing
on all arguments and returning the return value. When the proxy
function is called, it will call the split hook, whose return value
determines whether the original or patched version of the function
will be called next. This split hook is implemented in libdelta and
calls fork(). The parent and child process each return a different
value from the hook, causing both the original and patched version
to execute in parallel.
Note that we split as soon as the function containing the patch-
site is called. This does not mean that we execute the patch site.
Therefore, we may be in split execution longer than strictly neces-
sary.
Delta execution only supports modifications to the code. No
global variables can be introduced and no structs may be changed.
This is not problematic since most security patches only involve
small code changes [10].
4.2 Libdelta
Libdelta coordinates delta-execution. It does bookkeeping for each
process, allowing each to split and merge individually as patch-sites
are executed. It carries out splitting when the function containing
the patch-site is called, which is implemented using fork() as
described above.
When running in split state, a merge is attempted when a func-
tion returns. The intuition is that some task is finished, state cleared
and that we can thus test for state convergence. Hooks are installed
on function returns using a separate compile pass. Libdeltawill wait
for both the original and patched process to arrive at a function
return, before carrying out a full comparison of the memory state.
Comparing the memory state of two processes is an expensive
operation. We have optimized it by leveraging soft-dirty-bits [1] to
see which pages of memory were modified. Only these modified
pages are compared byte-by-byte. Differences are written to a file.
When there are none, the merge is successful and the patched
execution (child process) exit()’s and libdelta goes back to merged
execution. When a merge fails, it is attempted a number of times
on subsequent function returns. If the number of failed merges
exceeds a threshold, libdelta terminates all running processes and
concludes the input is not safe.
Libdelta needs to do I/O virtualization when in split execution,
because we do not want each I/O function to be executed twice; the
outside world should only perceive the effects of a single process.
On the other hand, the effects on process memory must be repli-
cated to both processes. Libdelta thus interposes a wide range of
libc functions to manage all interactions. Secondly, I/O calls are
intercepted to detect propagation of infected state. Currently, we
only compare buffers sent to system calls of the write-family and
detect calls that are not matched by the other process, indicating
propagation-through-absence
Finally, libdelta supports whitelisting of both global symbols and
allocated or mmap’ed regions. For the latter, the server that is under
analysis must be modified to call the whitelist function exposed by
libdelta.
5 RESULTS
At this point, we have only evaluated our framework with the
Heartbleed vulnerability. We were unable to test against other vul-
nerabilities because often a working patch or suitable seed inputs
were not available. We have also crafted a number of test servers,
which we use to demonstrate the technique. We discuss the out-
comes of these experiments as preliminary results.
5.1 Heartbleed
Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) is a critical information disclosure
vulnerability, which enables hackers to leak memory of an OpenSSL
server. It was one of the main drivers behind this research because
it contains a known discriminator, making it a good ground-truth
to benchmark our framework. Our testing framework correctly
identifies this ground truth as valid discriminator.
Furthermore, we assessed the effectiveness of the sanitizers to
detect information leakage. The address sanitizer (ASan) allowed
us to to leak up to 17725 bytes. This is quite large and likely due
to a large heap allocation. The memory sanitizer (MSan) reported
an uninitialized read when trying to leak 114 bytes or more. This
number is probably a lower-bound as more bytes may be initialized
when the server has been running for for a longer period of time.
Our framework reported a lot of diverged data when testing
the known discriminator. This is because the ssl3_write_bytes
function is called during split execution, which calls encryption
and I/O logic, touching many data structures. Since libdelta dumps
raw memory addresses and diverged data, which may differ per
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Table 1: Number of discriminators (Discr), safe (S) and prop-
agating (P) inputs found for each test server.
Server Candidate Discr. P S Other
echo server 138 0 8 1 129
echo server (2) 30 1 9 9 11
replace server 265 79 0 90 96
quote server 278 1 210 67 0
execution, it is very challenging to determine what the diverged
data represents, let alone whitelist it.
It turned out we could not test the fuzzer to find the known
discriminator. This is because the heartbeat is encrypted and VUzzer
taints bytes as soon as they are returned by read(), which is before
decryption. Obviously, VUzzer is is unable to reason about the
effects of a generated input on application logic executed after
decryption. This is a general limitation of fuzzers that generally
requires per-application knowledge to resolve.
5.2 Experiments
We have conducted a number of experiments with custom test
servers, listed in Table 1. We show the number of candidate inputs
generated by the fuzzer, followed by the number of discriminators
found. The remaining candidate inputs are classified in only-safe (S),
only-propagating (P) or other. Echo server can be found in Figure 2
and is completely different than Echo server (2) whose source listing
is omitted for brevity, just as the other two test servers.
We have found at least one discriminator for three out of four
servers. No discriminator was found for Echo server because the
fuzzer is not aware of the memory layout, nor aware of which input
bytes represent the size integer. size must be exactly 100 to find a
discriminator.
In case of Echo server (2) the discriminator could be found. VUzzer
analyzes CMP instructions and extracts their constant operand
which is injected in the input at the matching byte-offset. This
allowed VUzzer to execute the correct code path leading to the
discriminator.
The replace server has many discriminators, but these are false
positives. This is another example where safe overflows allow for
discrimination. Unfortunately, the compiler instrumentation adds
stack variables, making the safe overflow zone much larger than it
is in non-instrumented binaries.
6 RELATEDWORK
This work represents a new application of delta execution [10],
which was originally devised for efficient on-line patch validation.
Our implementation facilitates reliable detection of both state con-
vergence and propagating inputs, whereas the original paper aims
to support long-livedmultiple almost redundant executions (MAREs).
The original implementation is different as it can merge immedi-
ately when finished executing the patch-site. It will retain both
versions of the diverged state and will split again when any di-
verged state is accessed. Since our framework assumes rapid state
convergence, we have omitted this feature.
ZMap [3] is a fast single packet network scanner, designed for
internet-scale scanning. It can be used in conjunction with its sister
project ZGrab, which enables stateful application-layer handshakes
and is able to grab banners and detect vulnerability to Heartbleed.
As opposed to our work, all its scanning capabilities are hand-
coded so manual effort is required to support new vulnerabilities.
Our work can thus be used to enhance projects such as ZMap
andZGrab, automatically providing payloads used for detecting the
presence of vulnerabilities. We made use of the ZGrab codebase in
our Heartbleed experiments.
Mutation testing [2, 4, 6, 11], also known as mutant killing, is a
software testing technique that has some resemblance with discrim-
inator discovery. To assess the effectiveness of a test-suite, hundreds
of copies—the mutants—of a program-under-test are created. Each
of these have a single-statement mutation, analogous to a software
bug, which is created using a mutation operator. The number of
mutants killed (discovered) by the test-suite gives a good indication
of its coverage. In the context of our research, the patch would be a
mutation and we need to generate a test to kill it. Tools exist which
can kill mutants automatically, but these do not scale to support
real-world software [2, 6, 11]. Also, mutation operators introduce
simple and well-understood changes to a program, as opposed to
security patches. Finally, the problem of finding safe inputs is not
addressed.
7 DISCUSSION
The current implementation still lacks certain usability features. For
instance, when the delta execution frameworks fails to merge its
executions the output consists of raw data and memory addresses.
While it might be possible to leverage debug information for some
parts of the program, areas such as the heap still require more work
to decipher.
We found that the effectiveness of the sanitizers to detect infor-
mation leakage greatly depends on how the application manages
its memory. We rely on uninitialized memory and fine grained
heap allocations to accurately detect information disclosure. This
is also based on the assumption that the information leak uses a
memcpy’like operation to leak a contiguous range of memory.
Finally, this technique requires vulnerabilities that involve one or
multiple attacker-controlled dimensions. In case of buffer overflows
or information leakage through memcpy() an attacker typically con-
trols the buffer length. Thus, these dimensions offer a search space
in which discriminators can be found. Some vulnerability types,
such as null-pointer-dereference bugs will not have safe discrimina-
tors because they are either triggered or not.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we took the initial steps towards safe patch finger-
printing. It is a novel approach that could vastly improve the ef-
fectiveness of vulnerability scanners by automatically providing
fingerprints for themost recent vulnerabilities. It supports detection
of vulnerable servers through their behaviour, rather than relying
on detection of the software version.
Delta execution turned out to be an effective technique to test
whether an input is a discriminator. It allowed us to verify that
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Heartbleed has a discriminator according to our definitions. How-
ever, whitelisting the benign diverged state was very time consum-
ing. Demanding full state convergence is perhaps a bit too strict in
real-world scenarios.
We modified an existing fuzzer to automate discriminator discov-
ery. This lead to the discovery of discriminators in three out of four
test servers. More work is needed to make automated discovery
scale to realistic software.
This is work in progress. To determine how useful the scanning
the technique is in practice, we should conduct more experiments
with real-world applications. This is not trivial, as fully working
patches and malicious seed inputs as required by our approach are
not that widely available. Also, vulnerabilities whose patch does not
introduce propagating inputs cannot be scanned. Exploiting side-
channels and implementing delta execution on compiled binaries
provide avenues to answer more thoroughly the question about the
practicality of the approach.
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